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THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT AND GROUNDWATER:
WHY WASHINGTON STATE SHOULD REQUIRE
INCLUSION OF GROUNDWATER IN GENERAL
STREAM ADJUDICATIONS INVOLVING FEDERAL
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
Aubri Goldsby
Abstract: All water is connected through the hydrologic cycle.1 When a farmer pumps
water from an underground aquifer to irrigate crops, that act may affect a family relying on a
nearby surface water stream for its water supply. Despite the scientific link between surface
and groundwater,2 the law often treats the two separately.3 The legal choice to ignore the
interaction of surface and groundwater is particularly notable in “general stream
adjudications.” States file these large-scale lawsuits against users in a particular stream or
waterbody to determine, in a single lawsuit, all the rights existing in that water source.4 In
1952, Congress passed the McCarran Amendment, which allows states to adjudicate federal
reserved water rights in state court in general stream adjudications.5 The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Amendment as requiring that adjudications be
“comprehensive” of all of the rights in a given water source, but has not yet ruled as to
whether this requires inclusion of groundwater users.6 The Amendment itself is equally
vague on this point. This Comment argues against Ninth Circuit precedent and asserts that
for a general stream adjudication to be “comprehensive” under the McCarran Amendment, it
must include users of hydrologically connected surface and groundwater.

INTRODUCTION
The federal government has water rights in all waters set aside for a
federal purpose.7 Many states seek to delineate the size and scope of
1. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.02 (Robert E. Beck & Amy L. Kelly eds., 3d ed.
LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id. (describing how courts sometimes apply different methods to quantify rights in surface
water and groundwater).
4. Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 399, 421 (2006).
5. See McCarran Amendment, ch. 651, 66 Stat. 560 (1952) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666(a)
(2006)).
6. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618, 626 (1963).
7. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (“This Court has long held that when the
Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal
purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.”); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564, 577 (1908).
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these “reserved rights” to determine what waters are available for state
users.8 The most common way of resolving federal and state water rights
claims is through general stream adjudications.9 General stream
adjudications allow states to determine all rights to a given water source
in a single lawsuit. In order to make these adjudications more efficient,
Congress passed the McCarran Amendment.10
The McCarran Amendment waives federal sovereign immunity,
enabling states to include federal water rights in general stream
adjudications.11 In order for the waiver to take effect, however, the
adjudication must be sufficiently “comprehensive.”12 All claimants to a
water source must be included in the adjudication to meet the
comprehensiveness requirement.13 The adjudication must be more than a
mere attempt by private parties to establish their water rights with
respect to the federal government.14
The United States may challenge a state’s general stream
adjudication.15 Specifically, the United States may move to dismiss an
adjudication on the grounds that it is insufficiently comprehensive to
support a waiver of federal sovereign immunity.16 And while the United
States Supreme Court has never decided whether an adjudication must
include groundwater users connected to a surface water source in order
to be considered comprehensive, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
answered this question in the negative. In United States v. Oregon,17 the
Ninth Circuit held that a general stream adjudication need not include
groundwater users to be comprehensive under the McCarran
Amendment.18 This Comment asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s decision

8. See, e.g., In re Gen. Adjudication of Gila River Sys., 989 P.2d 739, 745 (Ariz. 1999); In re
Gen. Adjudication of the Big Horn Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 99–100 (Wyo. 1988).
9. See John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and
Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 299, 331–37 (2006) [hereinafter Thorson, Dividing
Western Waters II].
10. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976).
11. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006); see infra Part II (detailing the passage, purpose, and effect of the
McCarran Amendment).
12. Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big Is Big? The Scope of Water Rights Suits Under the McCarran
Amendment, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 627, 643 (1988) (discussing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 617–19
(1963)).
13. Id.
14. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 618, 626.
15. United States v. Dist. Court in and for the Cnty. of Eagle Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 522 (1971).
16. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 1994).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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was incorrect. In addition to being incorrect as a matter of law, the
practical consequences that may result argue for the inclusion of both
surface and groundwater in general stream adjudications. Because states
have the power to determine their own adjudication procedures,
Washington should not follow Ninth Circuit precedent when
adjudicating federal water rights.
Part I of this Comment explains the doctrine of federal reserved water
rights and the rights the federal government and Indian tribes maintain in
the waters within a state.19 Part II explains the McCarran Amendment
and analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of the
Amendment’s comprehensiveness requirement. It also details the
importance of water to tribal communities and their hesitancy to have
their water rights determined in state court. Part III discusses the concept
of hydrologic comprehensiveness and the relationship between surface
and groundwater. Part IV describes the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Oregon, where the court refused to require the inclusion
of groundwater users for a waiver of federal sovereign immunity under
the McCarran Amendment. Part V reviews Washington water law,
including Washington’s recognition of hydraulic continuity20 between
surface and groundwater. This Part explains the application of the
principle of hydraulic continuity to state water rights conflicts and
argues for its incorporation into disputes involving federal reserved
water rights. Part V also discusses the general stream adjudication
process in Washington. Finally, Part VI argues that the Washington State
Supreme Court should require the inclusion of both surface and
groundwater rights in general stream adjudications to satisfy the
comprehensiveness requirement of the McCarran Amendment.

19. This Comment focuses primarily on tribal water rights within the overall scheme of federal
reserved water rights. This focus predominates because tribes place great weight on water and
generally desire to have their water rights adjudicated in federal court due to strained relations with
the states. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court’s New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and
the McCarran Amendment: Toward Ending State Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARV.
ENVT’L. L. REV. 433, 433 (1994).
20. Washington State cases refer to a “hydraulic” connection between surface and groundwater as
opposed to a “hydrologic” connection, but the two words are interchangeable in this context.
Compare Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 86, 11 P.3d 726, 738 (2000)
with Oregon, 44 F.3d at 768–69.

021911WDR Goldsby after DTP with Short Title and Spacing Fixes.docx (Do Not Delete)

188
I.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

21/02/2011 04:41

[Vol. 86:185

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS RESERVED WATER
RIGHTS IN LANDS REQUIRING WATER TO FULFILL THE
PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE LANDS WERE SET ASIDE

Federal reserved water rights have been recognized since the early
twentieth century and form the basis for numerous water rights
disputes.21 State adjudications of water rights often implicate federal
claims. The reserved rights doctrine was developed in Winters v. United
States22 and provides the federal government with a water right at the
time land is set aside for a federal purpose—if necessary to fulfill that
purpose.23 Modern treatment of the doctrine suggests that it should be
extended to groundwater rights.24
A.

Winters v. United States Established the Federal Reserved Water
Rights Doctrine, Which Applies to Both Tribal and Non-Tribal
Lands

Most federal water rights are secured through the reserved rights
doctrine, which the United States Supreme Court established in 1908 in
Winters v. United States.25 In Winters, the Court held that the Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation had an implied water right dating back to
the day the reservation was established.26 In determining that an implied
water right existed, the Court looked at the purposes of the reservation,27
the practical need for water,28 and Indian law canons of construction.29
The Court held that the government’s purpose of moving tribes to
reservations in hopes of turning them into a “pastoral” people
necessarily required the recognition of water rights.30 Therefore, these

21. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II,
supra note 9, at 323–24.
22. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
23. Id. at 576.
24. See infra Part I.B.
25. Winters, 207 U.S. at 564; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.02, at 1172
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].
26. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.02, at 1172.
27. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 (“It was the policy of the government, it was the desire of the
Indians, to change those [nomadic] habits and to become a pastoral and civilized people.”).
28. Id. (“The lands were arid, and, without irrigation, were practically valueless.”).
29. Id. (“By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities
occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians.”); COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.02, at
1172.
30. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
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rights did not have to be explicit in the treaty creating the reservation.31
The Winters decision assured tribes enough water to carry out the
purposes of the reservation, with a priority date32 reflecting the date on
which the reservation was established.33 The Winters doctrine allows the
federal government to implicitly reserve waters when it enters into
treaties with Indian tribes.34 Initially, the Winters doctrine was thought to
apply only to Indian lands.35 As a result, although western states
recognized the Winters doctrine, they largely ignored it.36
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the merits
of the Winters doctrine as well as its application to non-tribal lands. The
Court’s 1963 decision in Arizona v. California37 answered any questions
about the doctrine’s vitality by extending the Winters doctrine to other,
non-Indian, federal reservations of land.38 Under this framework, if
Congress today reserved land for “a park, national forest, wildlife
refuge, military base, or other use of public land without explicitly
addressing water, the reservation of land implies Congress’ intention to
reserve water sufficient to accomplish congressional purposes.”39
Similar to Indian water rights reservations in Winters, the Court
established that the priority date of these non-tribal federal reserved

31. COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.02, at 1172. A reservation created by executive order or statute
also enjoys the same reserved water rights. Id. § 19.03[2][a], at 1176.
32. The priority date of a water right establishes its place in temporal proximity to other rights. A
right dated earlier (senior) to another right (junior) has priority over the other right. JOSEPH L. SAX
ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 125–26 (4th ed. 2006).
33. Winters, 207 U.S. at 572, 576–77; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[1], at 1174. Winters rights
are distinguishable from Winans rights, established in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381
(1905), which are rights that are “necessarily and impliedly reserved by the tribes in order to give
effect to their treaty rights.” COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.02, at 1172. For example, a Winans right to
hunt or fish would imply sufficient water to continue this practice, and thus a Winans right preserves
a pre-existing use of water, rather than creating a new use (such as the rights in Winters, which were
set aside for the tribes to take up new agrarian pursuits). See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394,
1408–15 (9th Cir. 1983); COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.02, at 1173; 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 1, § 37.02(a)(2).
34. John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and
Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355, 376 (2005) [hereinafter Thorson, Dividing Western
Waters I].
35. Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority Under
Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 265 (2006).
36. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460.
37. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
38. Id. at 346; Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460.
39. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460.
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rights is the date when the land is withdrawn from the public domain or
reserved for a particular purpose.40
In addition to expanding the scope of federal reserved water rights,
Arizona v. California also established the “practicably irrigable acreage”
(PIA) standard.41 This standard quantifies Indian reserved rights for
agricultural purposes by looking at the irrigation capabilities of the land
at a reasonable cost and allowing for a definite quantification of water
rights that can be prioritized within the appropriation system.42 The
standard troubled the western states, which contain the vast majority of
Indian lands.43 With the large acreage of Indian lands in these states,
there was a potential for extensive tribal claims to water.44 The PIA
standard thus prompted states to begin large-scale water rights
adjudications.45
B.

The Modern Trend Is to Recognize that the Reserved Water Rights
Doctrine Applies to Groundwater

The Winters doctrine refers only to surface waters, leaving uncertain
whether there are federal reserved rights to groundwater.46 The United
States Supreme Court addressed this question in 1976 in Cappaert v.
United States.47 In that case, nearby groundwater pumping by farmers
decreased the water in a part of Death Valley National Monument called
Devil’s Hole—a deep cavern with an underground pool inhabited by a
rare species of desert fish.48 The Court recognized that “when the
Federal Government withdraws its land from public domain and reserves
it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves
appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to
40. Id.
41. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 601.
42. Id. at 600–01; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[5][b], at 1185–86.
43. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460.
44. Id. In reality, the PIA standard often provides insufficient water for tribes with minimal
irrigable acres but other important water needs. COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[5][b], at 1185. For
more on the quantification of tribal waters for various uses, see Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water
Rights, Practical Reasoning, and Negotiated Settlements, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1142–46, 1148–53
(2010).
45. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460.
46. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 37.02(d) (“The principal unresolved issue
concerning the scope of waters subject to reserved rights is whether groundwater may be claimed.”).
At its most simplistic level, surface water is water existing above ground, such as lakes and rivers,
while groundwater can be viewed as “all water beneath the surface of the earth.” Id. § 18.02.
47. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
48. Id. at 131–33.
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accomplish the purpose of the reservation.”49 In determining a
reservation of water, the Court focused on the intent of the government
in setting the land aside.50 Intent could be inferred where unappropriated
waters would be necessary to fulfill the purposes for which the
reservation was made.51 Even though the actual water in Devil’s Hole
was surface water, the Court held that the United States could protect
itself from damaging groundwater diversions.52 While Cappaert did not
explicitly declare that federal reserved rights extend to groundwater,53 it
has nevertheless served as a basis for recognizing federal groundwater
rights in later cases.54
The U.S. Supreme Court did not address tribal groundwater rights in
Cappaert,55 but many state courts have extended Cappaert’s reasoning
to these rights.56 The Arizona State Supreme Court was the first state
supreme court to expressly acknowledge a tribal right to groundwater. In
the Gila River general stream adjudication,57 the Arizona State Supreme
Court limited the tribal right to groundwater to times when other sources
were inadequate to meet the purposes of the reservation.58 The Montana
State Supreme Court soon followed—holding that tribal reserved water
rights extend to groundwater—but did not limit the right like the

49. Id. at 138 (stating further that this right vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to
rights of subsequent appropriators).
50. Id. at 139.
51. Id. (finding that this intent existed for Devil’s Hole).
52. Id. at 142–43 (“[G]roundwater and surface water are physically interrelated as integral parts
of the hydrologic cycle.” (quoting C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT, AND
ADMINISTRATION, NAT’L WATER COMM’N LEGAL STUDY NO. 6, xxiv (1971))).
53. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 309.
54. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 37.02(d).
55. Id.
56. United States v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1058 (W.D. Wash. 2005); In
re Gen. Adjudication of Gila River Sys., 989 P.2d 739, 745 (Ariz. 1999); Confederated Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation v. Stultz, 59 P.3d 1093, 1098 (Mont. 2002).
57. Gila River Sys., 989 P.2d at 745 (rejecting the previous decision by the Wyoming State
Supreme Court to deny tribal rights to groundwater: “We can appreciate the hesitation of the Big
Horn court to break new ground, but we do not find its reasoning persuasive”). The only court to
rule on tribal rights to groundwater prior to Arizona was the Wyoming State Supreme Court in In re
Gen. Adjudication of the Big Horn Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 99–100 (Wyo. 1988). In that case, the Court
recognized that “[t]he logic which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater,” but then refused to find that a tribal right
to groundwater existed because no previous court had ever recognized the right. Id.
58. Gila River Sys., 989 P.2d at 747–48; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[2][b], at 1178; 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 37.02(d).
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Arizona court.59 In Washington, a federal district court upheld the
Lummi Indian Nation’s reserved right to groundwater, also without
limitation.60 As cases such as Cappaert and Gila River indicate, it
appears that the modern trend in western states is to recognize tribal
reserved rights to groundwater.61
II.

THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT WAIVES FEDERAL
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN COMPREHENSIVE STATE
WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATIONS

After federal reserved water rights were recognized in Winters, states
sought to delineate water rights within their boundaries through general
stream adjudications.62 States were not comfortable with the unknown
potential of tribal water rights claims and wanted to turn hypothetical
rights into quantified rights.63 The federal government frustrated this
scheme by regularly refusing to waive its sovereign immunity.64
Congress attempted to remedy this problem by enacting the McCarran
Amendment.65 The McCarran Amendment waives federal sovereign
59. Flathead Reservation, 59 P.3d at 1098; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[2][b], at 1178; 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 37.02(d).
60. United States v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. This order was vacated
due to a later settlement that allocated groundwater to the Lummi Peninsula portion of the Lummi
Reservation. United States ex rel. Lummi Indian Nation v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. C010047Z, 2007 WL 4190400 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2007); COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[2][b], at
1178–79 (2009 Supp. at 127).
61. See also COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[2][b], at 1177–78 (“Because of the hydrologic
interrelationship of ground and surface waters, either source should be available to the extent
necessary to satisfy the purposes of the reservation . . . . No reason has been advanced to exclude
groundwater, while hydrology, logic, and, often, economics all prescribe that it should be included
in the tribal right.”).
62. General stream adjudications are lawsuits joining together all entities claiming a right to use
water from a specific source in a single action to determine the rights and priorities for use of the
water. JAMES K. PHARRIS & P. THOMAS MCDONALD, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., AN
INTRODUCTION TO WASHINGTON WATER LAW, at IV:5 (Jan. 2000), available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/About_the_Office/Divisions/Ecology/Intro%20WA%2
0Water%20Law.pdf [hereinafter PHARRIS].
63. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460 (“The potential of large Indian
reserved water right claims on all of the West’s major rivers sent shock waves through the region.”).
64. Id. at 452–56. The basic meaning of sovereign immunity is that the sovereign, here the federal
government, cannot be sued without its consent. Feldman, supra note 19, at 454. The doctrine of
federal sovereign immunity originally appeared in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411–
12 (1821), and was soon expressly affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 463, 444 (1834). Feldman, supra note 19, at 455–56. Only an act of
Congress, such as the McCarran Amendment, can waive federal sovereign immunity. Feldman,
supra note 19, at 456.
65. Feldman, supra note 19, at 456.
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immunity in state general stream adjudications where the adjudication
covers all users of a given water source.66
A.

Congress Enacted the McCarran Amendment in 1952 to Allow
State Adjudications of Federal Water Rights, Including Tribal
Water Rights

In July 1952, Congress passed the McCarran Amendment, waiving
federal sovereign immunity for adjudications of federal water rights.67
Patrick McCarran, a United States senator from Nevada, opposed the
federal government’s frequent refusal to litigate water rights in state
courts.68 Senator McCarran sought to enable states to take control of
their own water resources.69 By waiving federal sovereign immunity, his
amendment paved the way for the modern general stream adjudication.70
States have the authority to allocate and quantify the surface and
groundwaters found within state boundaries.71 When federal reserved
water rights are adjudicated in a state proceeding, state laws regarding
the priority of water rights and the adjudication process apply.72
The McCarran Amendment created concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction over federal water rights controversies.73 In Colorado River

66. Id.
67. McCarran Amendment, ch. 651, 66 Stat. 560 (1952) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006)).
The text of the McCarran Amendment states:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of
rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such
rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring
water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the
United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any such
suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable
or that the United States is not amendable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be
subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain
review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States
in any such suit.
68. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 442–43.
69. Id. at 443.
70. Id. at 443, 458.
71. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 36.02 (“[A]s to the day-to-day actual
governmental control of the rights to use the waters of the United States, Congress has left
allocation decisions to the states” (citing California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement
Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935) as the “leading case summarizing the early statutes and cases and ratifying
the states’ freedom to develop the water law rules of their choice”)); see also id. § 35 (describing
situations where state authority yields to federal law, such as through the navigation servitude).
72. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006) (“The United States, when a party to any such suit [adjudication],
shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable.”).
73. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809 (1976).
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Water Conservation District v. United States,74 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a Colorado federal district court’s abstention
from a tribal water rights case in favor of a concurrent state
proceeding.75 Despite the heavy obligation on federal courts to exercise
their jurisdiction,76 the Court pointed to multiple factors supporting the
continuation of the suit in state court.77 These factors included the policy
underlying the McCarran Amendment to prevent piecemeal adjudication
of water rights.78
In the same case, the U.S. Supreme Court also held that the McCarran
Amendment extends to state adjudications of Indian water rights.79 In
Colorado River, the Court noted that its previous cases concerning the
McCarran Amendment did not distinguish between Indian and nonIndian water rights.80 The Court additionally observed that the legislative
history of the Amendment evinced a clear understanding by both its
proponents and opponents that it would include tribal water rights.81
Later, in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,82 tribes argued that the
McCarran Amendment waives only federal sovereign immunity and not
tribal sovereign immunity, particularly in states that have enacted

74. Id.
75. Id. at 820.
76. Id. at 817–18 (stating that there is a “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to
exercise the jurisdiction given them”).
77. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817, 819–20 (stating additional factors of “(a) the apparent absence
of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the motion to
dismiss, (b) the extensive involvement of state water rights occasioned by this suit naming 1,000
defendants, (c) the 300-mile distance between the District Court in Denver and the court in Division
7, and (d) the existing participation by the Government in Division 4, 5, and 6 proceedings”); see
also Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 359–63 (describing the status of both
state and federal water rights cases following the McCarran Amendment and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Colorado River).
78. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817, 819–20; Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at
359–63.
79. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 810–12; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.05[1], at 1206.
80. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 810.
81. Id. at 811. In 1983, the Supreme Court reiterated the congressional intent to avoid piecemeal
litigation in favor of larger state court adjudications in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe:
The McCarran Amendment, as interpreted in Colo. River, allows and encourages state courts to
undertake the task of quantifying Indian water rights in the course of comprehensive water
adjudications. Although adjudication of those rights in federal court instead might in the
abstract be practical, and even wise, it will be neither practical nor wise as long as it creates the
possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and controversy between the federal and state
forums, hurried and pressured decisionmaking, and confusion over the disposition of property
rights.
463 U.S. 545, 569 (1983).
82. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
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enabling statutes giving the federal government absolute control over
Indian lands.83 The Court agreed that the Amendment waived only
federal sovereign immunity, but then left tribes with the choice either to
allow the federal government to uphold their water rights as a trustee or
to waive tribal sovereign immunity and intervene in the state court
adjudications.84 The Court also held that states could quantify Indian
water rights in general stream adjudications despite the existence of an
enabling act disclaiming state jurisdiction.85 However, the Court asserted
that it would scrutinize any allegations of abuse of Indian water rights in
state courts.86
Even though the McCarran Amendment provides an avenue for state
determinations of federal water rights, tribes generally prefer
determination of their rights in a federal forum.87 As Frank Tenorio, the
governor of the San Felipe Pueblo, explained, “water is the blood of our
tribes.”88 The long history of conflict between tribal communities and
the states has caused tribes to distrust the states’ ability to protect tribal
interests.89 Tensions often escalate when natural resources such as water
are involved, where both the tribe and the state want access to the
disputed water resource.90 Senator Edward Kennedy noted that “Indian
water rights—no matter how critical to a tribe’s future, no matter how
well inventoried, no matter how brilliantly defended by government
attorneys, cannot receive full protection in State court forums.”91 Tribes
thus prefer to maintain water rights proceedings in federal court

83. See San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 549; Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra
note 9, at 335; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.05[1], at 1207.
84. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 566 n.17; COHEN supra note 25, § 19.05[1], at 1207.
85. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 563–64; Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra
note 9, at 336.
86. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 571. Additionally, federal courts have not actually been
divested of jurisdiction to determine reserved water rights and courts can in fact refuse to abstain in
favor of state court jurisdiction. For example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s right to do
so in United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1404–07 (9th Cir. 1983). COHEN, supra note 25,
§ 19.05[1], at 1208.
87. Feldman, supra note 19, at 434.
88. Id. at 433 (quoting Frank Tenorio, Epigraph to AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM,
INC., INDIAN WATER POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN WATER
RIGHTS, at 2 (Patricia Zell ed., 1982)).
89. See Feldman, supra note 19, at 435–53.
90. Id. at 445 (“The primary reason for states’ potential animosity toward Indians seeking water is
that water is a valuable and scarce resource, especially in the thirsty American West.”).
91. Id. at 449 (quoting Indian Water Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice
and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976)).
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whenever possible.92 This was made substantially more difficult
following the passage of the McCarran Amendment.93 With firm
jurisdiction over federal water rights, including tribal rights, states began
to quantify these rights actively through modern general stream
adjudications.94
B.

Adjudications Under the McCarran Amendment Must Be
Comprehensive and Include All of the Rights Asserted in the Water
Source

Determining what qualifies as a general stream adjudication is one of
the most contentious issues resulting from the McCarran Amendment.95
The McCarran Amendment itself mentions only adjudications of “a river
system or other source,”96 leaving little guidance for states to determine
exactly what waters this includes.97 The United States Supreme Court
clarified this somewhat in 1963 by establishing a comprehensiveness
requirement for general stream adjudications in Dugan v. Rank.98 This
comprehensiveness requirement means that the adjudication must be
inclusive of all of the rights of owners on a stream.99 The suit in Dugan
was a private suit to determine water rights between certain individuals
and the United States.100 Because it was a private suit, the action was not

92. Feldman, supra note 19, at 434.
93. Id. at 442 (“Many observers, including some on the [Supreme] Court, have viewed with
skepticism this application of the McCarran Amendment’s waiver of sovereign immunity to Indian
water rights and the resulting adjudication of Indian water claims in state courts. Not surprisingly,
the loudest voices of opposition have come from the Indian community.”).
94. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 337. The large stream adjudications
seen in Western states today took off in the 1970s as Wyoming, Arizona, Colorado, Montana, New
Mexico, Washington, and Idaho all undertook “massive” water rights adjudications. Id. at 304.
There are several reasons why states began to undertake these huge endeavors, including (but not
limited to) a fear of large unadjudicated federal reserved water rights, a desire to restore state
authority over water, a need to quantify and confirm existing rights, and the importance of
developing a centralized system of monitoring water use. Id. at 305–06.
95. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 458–59.
96. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006).
97. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 364 (“Water rights can be included or
not included in an adjudication based on source, geographic location, priority date, legal basis, or
type of water use, and it is unclear what exclusions are tolerable under the McCarran
Amendment.”); Pacheco, supra note 12, at 646.
98. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 610, 626 (1963) (denying the ability of riparian and other
overlying landowners to join the United States in a private suit to enjoin the Bureau of Reclamation
from diverting water at the Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River in California).
99. Anderson, supra note 4, at 421.
100. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 618.
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a general adjudication of “all of the rights of various owners on a given
stream” and was therefore not comprehensive enough for the McCarran
Amendment to apply.101 By requiring that the suit include all claimants
to water rights on the river and establish priority of water rights between
all users, the Court established the McCarran Amendment’s
comprehensiveness requirement.102
The U.S. Supreme Court again addressed comprehensiveness under
the McCarran Amendment in United States v. District Court in and for
the County of Eagle.103 In that case, the United States opposed an order
to file a claim to rights in the Eagle River, a tributary of the Colorado
River.104 The United States argued that Colorado’s adjudication was not
for a “river system” as called for under the McCarran Amendment
because it did not include the entire Colorado River.105 The Court
deemed this contention to be “almost frivolous” and held that the state
need only adjudicate a river system within its own jurisdiction.106
Scholars typically divide comprehensiveness inquiries into three
categories: use comprehensiveness, temporal comprehensiveness, and
hydrologic comprehensiveness.107 Use comprehensiveness focuses on
how the water is used and seeks to include all uses in an adjudication.108
Such uses include domestic, stock watering, or agricultural uses.109
Temporal comprehensiveness concerns what priority dates are included

101. Id. at 618–19 (quoting S. REP. NO. 755, at 9 (1951)). The Court also ruled that a suit could
not be brought against the Bureau of Reclamation officials because the relief sought in the suit (an
injunction and government funding of ten additional dams) would operate against the United States
and therefore violate sovereign immunity. Id. at 621. Respondents were forced to pursue another
avenue for relief by asserting that the Bureau’s action constituted a taking. Id. at 626.
102. Pacheco, supra note 12, at 643.
103. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
104. Id. at 521–22.
105. Id. at 523.
106. Id. Eagle County also held that the adjudication of rights under the McCarran Amendment
would include appropriative rights, riparian rights, and reserved rights. Id. at 524. In Eagle County’s
companion case, United States v. District Court for Water Division No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971), the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that the words “general adjudication” were used in Dugan v. Rank to
demonstrate that Congress intended for the McCarran Amendment only to reach adjudications
where all users in a water system were joined. Id. at 529. The Amendment was not intended to serve
as a means for individual claims to be brought against the United States. Id. The Colorado
adjudication process in Water Division No. 5, in which a water referee would sit and hear new water
rights applications on a monthly basis, was held to be comprehensive because it reached all claims
in the totality. Id.
107. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 363–68.
108. Id. at 366–67.
109. Id.
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in an adjudication.110 A temporal comprehensiveness requirement would
suggest that all priority dates should be adjudicated together.111 Finally,
hydrologic comprehensiveness focuses on the link between surface and
groundwater and would require a general stream adjudication to include
all hydrologically connected water sources.112
III. APPLICATION OF HYDROLOGIC COMPREHENSIVENESS
CREATES A LEGAL LINK BETWEEN SURFACE AND
GROUNDWATER
Because the McCarran Amendment is ambiguous, it is difficult for
states to decide whether groundwater must be included in general stream
adjudications.113 Hydrologic comprehensiveness focuses on the source
of water that must be included in an adjudication of federal rights under
the McCarran Amendment.114 Scientists have recognized the hydrologic
link between surface and groundwater.115 So has the United States
Supreme Court.116
Water continuously moves through the hydrologic cycle, and it is
difficult to distinguish between surface and groundwater.117 In fact, “[a]ll
groundwater in motion . . . ultimately will supply some stream. Hence,
arguments that all groundwater is tributary to a stream are scientifically
sound.”118 Despite the scientific recognition of the hydrologic link
110. Id. at 368. For example, Oregon adjudicates only pre-1909 water rights, asserting that all
subsequent rights have been adequately addressed through administrative procedures. See United
States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 767–68 (9th Cir. 1994).
111. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 367–68.
112. Id. at 364. This Comment addresses only hydrologic comprehensiveness, asserting that it is
the most essential to having productive stream adjudications due to the impact that groundwater
withdrawal can have on surface water rights regardless of type of use or temporal proximity. See
generally 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.02 (describing the science of
groundwater and its relationship to surface water).
113. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 365. Hydrological comprehensiveness
may also look at how much of a river and how many tributaries should be included in an
adjudication. This Comment, however, focuses on the groundwater and surface water aspects of
hydrological comprehensiveness.
114. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 364.
115. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.02 (quoting Mary P. Anderson,
Hydrogeologic Framework for Groundwater Protection, in PLANNING FOR GROUNDWATER
PROTECTION 1, 1–2 (G. William Page ed., 1987)).
116. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142–43 (1976).
117. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.02 (quoting Mary P. Anderson,
Hydrogeologic Framework for Groundwater Protection, in PLANNING FOR GROUNDWATER
PROTECTION 1, 1–2 (G. William Page ed., 1987)).
118. Id.
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between surface and groundwater, the law has been slow to
acknowledge this connection.119 Since the first half of the twentieth
century, prominent water law scholars such as Samuel Wiel have pushed
states to recognize the unavoidable connection between surface and
groundwater and to unify the laws regulating the two.120 Similarly, noted
natural resources scholar Charles Wilkinson has observed that the
traditional legal approach to surface and groundwater fails to
acknowledge the “hydrologic reality” of their connection.121
One way of responding to this “hydrologic reality” is to pursue an
integrated approach to surface and groundwater.122 Because so much
more information regarding hydrology is now available, courts are able
to identify specific groundwater rights and the way in which
groundwater pumping affects surface water.123 States adjudicating
federal water rights now have the capability to map both the location of
groundwater and its interaction with surface water.124 Some western
states, such as Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, and Utah, adjudicate both
surface and groundwater sources together.125 Even the United States
Supreme Court has recognized the hydraulic link between surface and
groundwater.126 In Cappaert v. United States, the Court allowed
protection of federal water rights from nearby groundwater withdrawals
because “groundwater and surface water are physically interrelated as
integral parts of the hydrologic cycle.”127
119. Id.
120. Samuel C. Wiel, Need of Unified Law for Surface and Underground Water, 2 S. CAL. L.
REV. 358, 362 (1929); 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.03.
121. Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317, 321–22
(1985) (“[W]e have learned that ground water is usually hydrologically related to surface water, so
that the traditional system of managing surface water and ground water separately fails to reflect the
hydrologic reality: conjunctive management of underground and surface resources is required when
the two connect up.”).
122. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.03 (citing Earl Finbar Murphy, Some
Legal Solutions for Contemporary Problems Concerning Groundwater and Aquifers, 4 J. MIN. L. &
POL’Y 49 (1988)).
123. Id. (“[G]roundwater management or litigation does not require, in many cases, massive
research for new knowledge and it provides a method for evaluation that can direct: the use of
scarce resources; the way surface land is used; and the impact of demand of many kinds upon the
groundwater resource.”).
124. See id. § 18.03(a).
125. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 365 (citing COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-82-101 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-103 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.030
(LexisNexis 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-4-3 (2005)).
126. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142–43 (1976).
127. Id. (quoting C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT, AND ADMINISTRATION,
NAT’L WATER COMM’N LEGAL STUDY NO. 6, xxiv (1971)).
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Still, other states such as New Mexico maintain separate procedures
for adjudicating groundwater and surface water claims.128 Likewise, in
Arizona and Texas, the “hydrologic myth that groundwater is somehow
separate from surface water prevails.”129 Washington State uses the same
statutory procedure to adjudicate surface and groundwater, but has yet to
include groundwater in a surface water general stream adjudication.130
IV. IN UNITED STATES V. OREGON, THE NINTH CIRCUIT HELD
THAT THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT DOES NOT
REQUIRE HYDROLOGIC COMPREHENSIVENESS
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the only federal appellate court
to address a claim of hydrologic comprehensiveness in detail. In 1990,
the State of Oregon began an adjudication of the Klamath River Basin
and attempted to include the United States as a defendant on behalf of
several federal agencies and as a trustee for the Klamath Tribe.131 The
United States responded by filing suit in federal court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the United States had not waived its sovereign
immunity.132 The United States claimed that its sovereign immunity had
not been waived because Oregon’s adjudication was not comprehensive
for purposes of the McCarran Amendment.133
The United States’ primary comprehensiveness argument was that the
adjudication failed to include groundwater claims in the Klamath
Basin.134 The United States stressed that the McCarran Amendment’s
overarching purpose was to avoid piecemeal litigation.135 In supporting
128. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 365 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 725A-1 (2005)).
129. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A) (2005); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.312
(West 2005)).
130. See infra Part V.
131. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1994). This is Oregon’s second
adjudication of the Klamath River Basin. In 1975, Oregon notified the United States and the
Klamath Tribe of its intent to adjudicate, and the United States instituted a federal suit seeking a
declaration of federal water rights in the basin, subsequently halting the adjudication. The federal
suit went to the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), where the
court held that while the United States and the Klamath Tribe did have water rights, quantification
was left to the state in a general stream adjudication. Oregon renewed its attempt to adjudicate the
Klamath River Basin in 1990. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 762.
132. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 762.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 768.
135. Brief for the United States in Reply as Appellant and in Response as Cross-Appellee at 30,
United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-36983, 92-36985, 92-36987, 9237001), 1993 WL 13099176 [hereinafter United States Reply Brief].
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this argument, the United States pointed to cases holding that the
McCarran Amendment requires adjudicating interrelated water rights in
the same proceeding.136 The United States argued that the McCarran
Amendment’s comprehensiveness requirement “makes no sense if an
adjudication excludes adjudication of groundwater rights claims, the
exercise of which could impair surface water rights.”137 The United
States also emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on
the specific question of groundwater inclusion under the McCarran
Amendment, and thus no prior precedent was entirely on point.138
The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge William A. Norris, rejected
these arguments.139 The court focused first on the language of the
McCarran Amendment, which states that it applies to “water of a river
system or other source.”140 The court interpreted “or” to mean that a
state had a choice between adjudicating surface water or adjudicating
groundwater,141 and held that the state did not have to do both.142 While
the court acknowledged that one of the main purposes of the McCarran
Amendment was to avoid piecemeal litigation, it relied heavily on the

136. Id. at 30–31 (citing, among others, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S 800, 810–11 (1976) (cannot exclude Indian water rights); United States v. Dist. Court in
and for the Cnty. of Eagle Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971) (cannot exclude federal reserved rights);
Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. United States, 830 F.2d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1987) (need all claimants
on the stream); S. Delta Water Agency v. Dep’t of the Interior, 767 F.2d 531, 542 (9th Cir. 1985)
(need all conflicting claims for joinder of U.S.); In re Snake River Basin Water Sys., 764 P.2d 78,
86 (Ida. 1988) (joinder of U.S. required joinder of two hydrologically related sub-basins)).
137. United States Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 29–30 n.14. The United States specifically
noted that an adjudication without groundwater: “(1) would not include all users of the river
system’s water, (2) would not include all rights in the river system’s water, and (3) would not
include all water sources of the river system.” Brief for the United States of America as Appellant at
43, United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-36983, 92-36985, 92-36987, 9237001), 1993 WL 13011224.
138. United States Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 28. In the Senate Report on the McCarran
Amendment, a reference is made to the adjudication in Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S.
440 (1916), as an example of a valid adjudication under the Amendment. Because that particular
adjudication did not include groundwater, Oregon argued that groundwater inclusion was not
necessary. Appellees’/Cross-Appellants’ Brief at 17–18, United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th
Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-36983, 92-36985, 92-36987, 92-37001), 1993 WL 13011225. The United States
pointed out that groundwater was not an issue in that particular adjudication and that the quote used
in the Senate Report (that an adjudication “is intended to be universal and to result in a complete
ascertainment of all existing rights”) does not make sense if groundwater claims that would impact
surface water are not included. United States Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 28–29 n.14 (citing S.
REP. NO. 755, at 5 (1951)).
139. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 758.
140. Id. at 768 (quotation marks omitted) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 768.

021911WDR Goldsby after DTP with Short Title and Spacing Fixes.docx (Do Not Delete)

202

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

21/02/2011 04:41

[Vol. 86:185

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Eagle County.143 Eagle
County stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to include every
single hydrologically connected water source in a general stream
adjudication, particularly where those water sources extend beyond the
state’s boundaries.144 The court used Eagle County to support its holding
that hydrologic comprehensiveness was unnecessary and that
groundwater rights need not be included.145
The Ninth Circuit then analyzed how the law has responded to the
science of hydrologically related water sources. The court stated that the
law traditionally treated surface and groundwater differently by applying
different regulatory schemes to the two types of water.146 It also noted
that different states apply riparian, absolute dominion, American
reasonable use, and correlative rights doctrines to groundwater, none of
which establish temporal priority by use.147 In determining that some
states did not apply prior appropriation to groundwater, thereby not
assessing rights by temporal proximity, the court concluded that the
adjudication procedure’s major function—determining the priority of
water rights—was absent.148 The court then looked to which
groundwater regimes states used in 1952, the year the McCarran
Amendment took effect. Because not all states used prior appropriation
for groundwater in 1952, the court found that the law was not yet ready
to embrace a hydrologic continuity approach to stream adjudications.149

143. Id. at 768–70.
144. United States v. Dist. Court in and for the Cnty. of Eagle Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971);
see supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.
145. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 769 (stating that the discussion of an adjudication touching many states
in Eagle County “suggests that, contrary to the United States’ assertions, the comprehensiveness
requirement does not mandate that every hydrologically-related water source be included in the
adjudication”).
146. Id. (“One of the ways in which the law has traditionally ignored the exhortation of the
scientists is by treating ground and surface water as distinct subjects, often applying separate law to
each. While rights to surface water in the Western states have generally been allocated under the
appropriation doctrine, the rights to groundwater were traditionally riparian.”).
147. Id. at 769; see also SAX, supra note 32, at 415–17 (describing the five primary means by
which American jurisdictions quantify groundwater rights: (1) capture, which operates on a “first
come, first serve” basis; (2) American reasonable use, in which the water must be put to reasonable
use on the overlying tract with no limit to amount provided use is reasonable; (3) correlative rights,
which requires equal sharing of the water between overlying landowners; (4) the Restatement
(Second) of Torts reasonable use, which lays out specific rules of allocation; and (5) prior
appropriation, which applies a “first in time, first in right” framework to water rights).
148. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 769.
149. Id. at 769–70 & n.9 (noting that in 1952 prior appropriation for groundwater was used in
Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Utah, while riparian doctrines applied in Arizona,
California, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming). The
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The court did acknowledge that since 1952 some states have moved
toward better coordination between quantifying surface and groundwater
rights.150 The court concluded, however, that the “recognition is too
recent and too incomplete” to require disposition of groundwater rights
in general stream adjudications under the McCarran Amendment.151 The
court thus held that hydrologic comprehensiveness was not required to
waive federal sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment.152
After the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Klamath Tribe petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.153 The Office of the
United States Solicitor General submitted a brief to the Court in
opposition to the cert petition.154 While the Solicitor General ultimately
concluded that the time was not right for the Court to review the Ninth
Circuit’s decision, the Solicitor General expressed the opinion that the
Ninth Circuit was actually in error. The Solicitor General noted that the
surface and groundwater in the Klamath Basin were hydrologically
connected and that the purpose of the McCarran Amendment was to
require comprehensive adjudications of entire river systems.155 The
Solicitor General went on to state that an adjudication excluding
hydrologically connected groundwater “defeats ‘Congress’ purposes’ by
encouraging future piecemeal adjudication.”156 However, despite the
assertion that the Ninth Circuit had incorrectly ruled on the groundwater
issue in United States v. Oregon, the Solicitor General recommended
that the U.S. Supreme Court not grant the cert petition because the issue
had not received significant consideration in other courts of appeals or
the highest courts of the various states.157

court was incorrect here regarding its characterization of Washington water law. Washington has
applied a prior appropriation system to groundwater since 1945. See Act of Mar. 19, 1945, ch. 263,
1944–45 Wash. Sess. Laws 826 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.44 (2010)); PHARRIS,
supra note 62, at V:9.
150. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 769 (“[A]n increased recognition of the relationship between ground and
surface water has led some states to attempt better coordination between the allocation of surface
and groundwater rights . . . .”).
151. Id. at 770.
152. Id.
153. United States v. Oregon, 516 U.S. 943 (1995) (denying certiorari).
154. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 10, Klamath Tribe v. Oregon, 516 U.S. 943
(1995) (No. 95-151), 1995 WL 17047729.
155. Id. at 10–11.
156. Id. at 11.
157. Id. The Solicitor General also noted the existence of other, “albeit less effective,” remedies
available to the Klamath Tribe, such as adjudicating groundwater in federal court. Id. 11–12.
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WASHINGTON RECOGNIZES HYDRAULIC CONTINUITY,
BUT HAS NOT APPLIED IT IN GENERAL STREAM
ADJUDICATIONS

Since 1944, Washington has applied the prior appropriation system to
both surface and groundwater.158 The Washington State Legislature and
the Washington State Supreme Court have both acknowledged the
science of hydraulic continuity between surface and groundwater and the
impact that groundwater withdrawal can have on surface waters.159
Washington has accepted the science of hydraulic continuity in resolving
state water rights disputes.160 However, Washington’s general stream
adjudication process permits, but does not require, the inclusion of both
surface and groundwater users.161 Even so, conflicts involving federal
reserved water rights could draw from state case law to incorporate the
principle of hydraulic continuity into general stream adjudications.
A.

Washington Applies the Prior Appropriation System to Both
Surface and Groundwater and Accepts the Science of Hydraulic
Continuity

Washington State has established the prior appropriation system for
both surface and groundwater.162 To regulate surface water, the state
legislature enacted the Water Code of 1917.163 The Code established the
prior appropriation system for surface water and created a permit system
to govern surface water use.164 To regulate groundwater, the legislature

158. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.03 (2010) (Surface Water Code); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.44
(2010) (Groundwater Code); Tom McDonald, Washington, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ I(A)(4),(6) (Robert E. Beck & Amy L. Kelly eds., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2009).
Prior appropriation is based on a “first in time, first in right” approach to water rights. WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.03.010 (2010).
159. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 95, 11 P.3d 726, 742 (2000);
Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 226 n.1, 858 P.2d 232, 236 n.1 (1993); WASH.
REV. CODE § 90.44.030 (2010).
160. See, e.g. Postema, at 95, 11 P.3d at 742.
161. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.220 (2010) (allowing the Department of Ecology to
have a general stream adjudication include “either rights to the use of surface water or to the use of
groundwater, or both”).
162. States have the power to regulate waters within their boundaries. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
163. Act of Mar. 14, 1917, ch. 117, 1917 Wash. Sess. Laws 447 (codified as amended at WASH.
REV. CODE ch. 90.03 (2010)).
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2010) (“[A]s between appropriations, the first in time shall
be the first in right.”). The Washington State Supreme Court gave riparian owners fifteen years
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adopted the Groundwater Code in 1945.165 The Groundwater Code
extended the prior appropriation system to groundwater and made the
permit system the sole method for obtaining groundwater rights.166
Washington’s statutory regime recognizes hydraulic continuity
between surface and groundwater. In enacting the Groundwater Code,
the Washington State Legislature acknowledged the potential for conflict
between surface and groundwater users and stressed the priority of
surface water rights.167 The legislature also directed the Washington
State Department of Ecology, the state agency responsible for
determining water rights, to give “[f]ull recognition . . . in the
administration of water allocation and use programs to the natural
interrelationships of surface and groundwaters.”168 The Washington
State Supreme Court recognized this legislative intent in Rettkowski v.
Department of Ecology,169 holding that groundwater rights should “be
considered a part of the overall water appropriation scheme, subject to
the paramount rule of ‘first in time, first in right.’”170
In addition to Rettkowski, two other Washington cases have positively
addressed the hydraulic continuity between surface and groundwaters.

(until 1932) to develop their riparian water rights and put them to beneficial use before they became
subject to abandonment or forfeiture. In re Deadman Creek, 103 Wash. 2d 686, 695, 694 P.2d 1071,
1076 (1985).
165. Act of Mar. 19, 1945, 1944–45 Wash. Sess. Laws 826 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 90.44 (2010)). WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.035 (2010) defines groundwaters:
[A]ll waters that exist beneath the land surface or beneath the bed of any stream, lake or
reservoir, or other body of surface water within the boundaries of this state, whatever may be
the geological formation or structure in which such water stands or flows, percolates or
otherwise moves. There is a recognized distinction between natural groundwater and
artificially stored groundwater.
166. PHARRIS, supra note 62, at V:9; McDonald, supra note 158, § I(A)(6). WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.44.060 (2010) specifically references §§ 90.03.250–.340 of the surface code to describe the
permitting system. However, the Groundwater Code contains an exemption from the permitting
process for stockwater, domestic uses on less than one-half acre of land, and industrial or domestic
uses of less than 5,000 gallons per day. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2010); McDonald, supra
note 158, § I(A)(6). For more information on litigation surrounding the stockwater exemption, see
State Water Use Laws: The Groundwater Permit Exemption RCW 90.44.050, WASH. DEP’T OF
ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/comp_enforce/gwpe.html (last visited Jan. 26,
2011).
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.030 (2010) (“[T]o the extent that any underground water is part
of or tributary to the source of any surface stream or lake, or that the withdrawal of groundwater
may affect the flow of any spring, water course, lake, or other body of surface water, the right of an
appropriator and owner of surface water shall be superior to any subsequent right hereby authorized
to be acquired in or to groundwater.”).
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.020(9) (2010).
169. Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 226 n.1, 858 P.2d 232, 236 n.1 (1993).
170. Id.; PHARRIS, supra note 62, at V:29.
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First, in Hubbard v. State,171 the Washington Court of Appeals upheld
the Department of Ecology’s decision to place conditions on
groundwater permits where groundwater use would result in the
Okanogan River being below minimum instream flows.172 The court
focused on a finding of “significant hydraulic continuity” between the
Wagonroad Coulee aquifer and the Okanogan River.173 The court stated
that where significant hydraulic continuity exists, “the groundwater
rights permit must be subject to the same conditions, i.e., restrictions on
withdrawal, as the affected surface water.”174
The second case to recognize hydraulic continuity between surface
and groundwater was Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Board.175
In Postema, the Washington State Supreme Court held that the state
must deny a groundwater permit when there is hydraulic continuity and
when groundwater withdrawal would negatively impact surface water
rights.176 Furthermore, the court held that when a basin is closed to
appropriations, a groundwater permit in hydraulic continuity with the
basin must be denied if there is evidence that the withdrawal will affect
flow or surface water levels.177 These two cases demonstrate that
Washington courts recognize the necessity of addressing hydraulic
continuity when permitting both surface and groundwater uses.

171. 86 Wash. App. 119, 936 P.2d 27 (1997)
172. Id. at 121, 936 P.2d at 28.
173. Id. at 125, 936 P.2d at 29 (quoting WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-549-060 (2009)).
174. Id. The court in Hubbard relied upon the Washington Administrative Code (WAC)
governing water rights for that particular region of Washington. This code provision applied the
same requirements to hydraulically linked surface and groundwater. Id. at 126, 936 P.2d at 30
(citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-549-060 (2009)). Washington is divided into Water Resource
Inventory Areas (WRIA), with each WRIA adopting resource protection plans for the area. Not all
WRIAs will have the same standards, meaning that different WAC provisions apply to the various
areas. Jeffrey S. Myers, Water Rights Responsibilities for Counties in the Wake of 1997 AGO No. 6,
WAPA Summer Training Program: Civil Track (June 24–26, 1998), http://www.mrsc.org/
Subjects/Environment/water/WAPAMY.aspx.
175. 142 Wash. 2d 68, 11 P.3d 726 (2000).
176. Id. at 95, 11 P.3d at 742. The court looked only to “hydraulic continuity” instead of
“significant hydraulic continuity” because the WRIA at issue in Postema did not fall under the same
WAC as in Hubbard. Id. at 86, 11 P.3d at 738.
177. Id. at 95, 11 P.3d at 742.
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Washington’s Statutory General Stream Adjudication Process
Does Not Require Inclusion of Both Surface and Groundwater

In Washington, the general stream adjudication process is the only
way to give legal certainty to water rights.178 General stream
adjudications are governed by the Surface Water Code for surface
water179 and the Groundwater Code for groundwater.180 The Washington
State Department of Ecology begins the adjudication process by filing
suit in superior court.181 Water rights holders in the adjudicated area are
then notified of the suit and the holders are required to file a claim in
order to become a defendant.182 Each claimant—the defendant in an
adjudication—must file evidence with the court to support the water
right they claim.183 The Department of Ecology then holds an
evidentiary hearing regarding the water right.184 The adjudication statute
instructs the Department of Ecology and the claimants to confer together
when appropriate and also encourages settlement agreements at the
hearing stage.185
After the evidentiary hearing, the Department of Ecology issues a
report of findings and recommendations to the superior court.186 Based
on the evidence and findings, the Department of Ecology either files a
motion for a partial decree in favor of the claims it has deemed
substantiated, or a motion seeking in-court determinations of contested
claims.187 Should a claimant disagree with the Department of Ecology,

178. Water Right General Adjudications, STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/WR/rights/adjhome.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
179. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.110–90.03.240 (2010). There have been eighty-two stream
adjudications in Washington since the Water Code of 1917 was enacted. Water Right General
Adjudications, STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/WR/
rights/adjhome.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). The longest running adjudication is the Yakima
River Basin Surface Water Adjudication (also known as the Acquavella adjudication), which began
in 1977 and is now in its final stages. Barbara Markham, Asst. Att’y Gen., Ecology Div., Water
Section, Wash. State Office of the Att’y Gen., Presentation at the 22nd Annual University of
Washington Indian Law Symposium (Sept. 11, 2009).
180. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.220 (2010) (applying the provisions of WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 90.03.110–.240 (2010) to groundwater adjudications); see also McDonald, supra note 158,
§ I(A)(5).
181. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.110(1) (2010).
182. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.120 (2010).
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.635 (2010).
184. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.640(1), .160(2) (2010).
185. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.640(2)(b) (2010).
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.640(3) (2010).
187. Id.
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that claimant may file an exception to the report.188 Once all of the
exceptions are decided, the superior court issues a final decree and the
Department of Ecology provides a Certificate of Adjudicated Water
Right for each affirmed right.189 This certificate represents a legally valid
right and will include the priority date, purpose of use, quantity, point of
diversion, place of use, and any limitations on the right.190
The legislature amended Washington’s general stream adjudication
statutes in July 2009.191 The changes require the Department of Ecology
to review all claims filed and then move to either accept the claims or
have them be determined by a court.192 The new legislation also
encourages the Department of Ecology and claimants to “work closely
together” to resolve claims outside of court.193 The 2009 amendments do
not mandate that groundwater be included in a surface water
adjudication where federal reserved water rights are at issue. The
Department of Ecology, however, does have the ability to define the
scope of an adjudication through both the Surface Water194 and
Groundwater Code, with the Groundwater Code providing that the
adjudication may include “either rights to the use of surface water or to
the use of groundwater, or both.”195 Thus, while the Department of
Ecology can include both surface and groundwater within the same
adjudication, it is not required to do so.196 The statute, except for fee
exemptions, is silent on situations involving federal reserved water
rights.197
188. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.160(1) (2010).
189. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.240 (2010).
190. Id.
191. Act of May 5, 2009, ch. 332, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 1663 (current version at WASH REV.
CODE ch. 90.03).
192. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.640(3) (2010); Barbara Markham, supra note 179.
193. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.640(2)(b), 90.03.645 (2010); Barbara Markham, supra note
179.
194. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.110(1) (2010) (“Upon the filing of a petition with the department
by a planning unit or by one or more persons claiming the right to divert any waters within the state
or when, after investigation, in the judgment of the department, the public interest will be served by
a determination of the rights thereto, the department shall prepare a statement of the facts, together
with a plan or map of the locality under investigation, and file such statement and plan or map in the
superior court of the county in which said water is situated.”).
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.220 (2010).
196. Id.
197. The United States government and Indian tribes are exempt from paying filing and other
fees in adjudications under the McCarran Amendment because the Amendment specifically states
that “no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States.” 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006).
In Washington, this is codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.180, .200 (2010).
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Washington’s Yakima River Basin Adjudication Did Not Include
Groundwater

The longest running general stream adjudication in Washington State
is the Acquavella surface water adjudication in the Yakima River
Basin.198 In Acquavella, the Yakima County Superior Court rejected the
assertion that joinder of groundwater users is required for a waiver of
federal sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment.199 In
August of 1984, ten years before the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Oregon, the United States filed a motion in the Acquavella
adjudication to join groundwater users as necessary parties or dismiss
the United States.200 The superior court, in a decision by Judge Walter A.
Stauffacher, began its opinion by discussing groundwater use in the
Yakima River Basin.201 The court noted that there were three principal
aquifers in the region and approximately 19,000 known claimants to
groundwater rights.202 The court also acknowledged, to the agreement of
all parties, that groundwater in the area was “hydrologically connected
to the Yakima River and its tributaries.”203 The court noted that
groundwater pumping would diminish surface stream flow.204
The court then discussed general stream adjudications, focusing on
the McCarran Amendment’s text and what Congress knew in 1952 when
the Amendment was passed.205 Because Congress had acknowledged the
existence of groundwater in the Senate Report on the McCarran
Amendment, the court asserted that the language “river system or other
source” in the McCarran Amendment “clearly” distinguished between
surface water and groundwater.206 The separation of “river system” and
198. The Acquavella adjudication began in October 1977 and continues through the present day.
Memorandum Opinion re: Motion to Join Parties or Dismiss the United States at 1, Dep’t of
Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1985). This opinion is not
available in most legal databases. It is on file with Washington Law Review. For updates on the
progress of the Acquavella adjudication see Water Right General Adjudications, STATE OF WASH.
DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/rights/adjhome.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2011).
199. Memorandum Opinion re: Motion to Join Parties or Dismiss the United States at 1, Dep’t of
Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1985). This opinion is not
available in most legal databases. It is on file with Washington Law Review.
200. Id. at 3.
201. Id. at 3–5.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 4.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 9–10.
206. Id. at 10.
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“other source” with an “or” in the McCarran Amendment was held to
allow for comprehensive adjudications of either surface water or
groundwater.207 In addition, the court found that Congress implicitly
accepted Washington’s adjudication process because it existed at the
time Congress passed the Amendment.208 Finally, the court relied on the
fact that it was not then “presently possible to” predict the impact
groundwater pumping would have on surface water streamflow.209 The
court maintained its jurisdiction over the United States through the
McCarran Amendment and allowed the adjudication to proceed.210
VI. WASHINGTON SHOULD INCLUDE GROUNDWATER IN
GENERAL STREAM ADJUDICATIONS INVOLVING
FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS
Washington should require the inclusion of hydrologically connected
surface and groundwater users when adjudicating federal reserved water
rights. The Washington State Supreme Court should reject the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Oregon. The Washington State
Supreme Court is not bound by Ninth Circuit precedent and can choose
to interpret the McCarran Amendment to include groundwater.211
Washington should also re-examine the Yakima County Superior
Court’s outdated understanding of hydraulic continuity in the Acquavella
adjudication. By doing so, the Washington State Supreme Court would
re-affirm the connection between surface and groundwater and protect
federal reserved water rights, including the important water rights of
Indian tribes. Adjudicating surface and groundwater users together
would also avoid piecemeal litigation, accomplishing the McCarran
Amendment’s primary purpose. This is especially true as Washington
faces ongoing water rights disputes across the state in the years ahead.

207. Id.
208. Id. at 14.
209. Id. at 17.
210. Id. at 19.
211. In re Detention of Turay, 139 Wash. 2d 379, 402, 986 P.2d 790, 802 (1999) (“[F]ederal case
law interpreting a federal rule is not binding on [the Washington State Supreme Court] even where
the rule is identical ‘this court is the final authority insofar as interpretations of this State’s rules is
concerned.’” (quoting State v. Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d 244, 258–59, 922 P.2d 1304, 1314 (1996))).
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The Washington State Supreme Court Should Reject the Ninth
Circuit’s Flawed Reasoning in United States v. Oregon

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Oregon that
groundwater was not necessary for a comprehensive adjudication under
the McCarran Amendment was incorrect for two reasons. First, the
Ninth Circuit failed to distinguish groundwater users from the out-ofstate water right holders at issue in Eagle County. This omission ignores
the importance of hydrologic continuity, similar to the Yakima County
Superior Court’s ruling in the Acquavella adjudication. Second, the
Ninth Circuit incorrectly reasoned that water law treats surface and
groundwater separately. This narrow conception of water law ignores
important considerations for treating surface and groundwater together,
including the consistent adjudication of tribal water rights.
The Ninth Circuit placed too much precedential value upon the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Eagle County. In Eagle
County, the United States argued that all connected water sources need
to be adjudicated at the same time in order to join the federal
government under the McCarran Amendment.212 The Court properly
held that the McCarran Amendment’s comprehensiveness requirement
did not require states to include all connected water sources that ran into
other states.213 In its heavy reliance on Eagle County, the Ninth Circuit
failed to properly distinguish in-state groundwater users from the out-ofstate water users at issue in Eagle County. In Eagle County, the U.S.
Supreme Court said the government’s argument for state adjudication of
out-of-state water rights was “almost frivolous.” 214 Arguing that
hydrologically connected surface and groundwater be adjudicated at the
same time is not “almost frivolous.” It is an argument based on sound
science and a growing legal trend. The U.S. Supreme Court itself has
acknowledged that “groundwater and surface water are physically
interrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle.”215 The unfounded
claims rejected in Eagle County should not tarnish the important and
legitimate connection between surface and groundwater.
In Washington, the Yakima County Superior Court made a similar
ruling to United States v. Oregon, holding in 1985 that a general stream
212. United States v. Dist. Court in and for the Cnty. of Eagle Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976) (quoting C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER
LAW, MANAGEMENT, AND ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION LEGAL STUDY NO.
6, xxiv (1971)).
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adjudication did not require groundwater.216 This decision should not be
conclusive. First, the court recognized hydraulic continuity, a science
that has been further developed and incorporated into the Washington
legal system in cases such as Hubbard217 and Postema.218 Importantly, in
Postema, the Washington State Supreme Court stated that “[The
Department of] Ecology may use new information and scientific
methodology as it becomes available and scientifically acceptable for
determining hydraulic continuity and the effect of groundwater
withdrawals on surface waters.”219 The inclusion of both surface and
groundwater in future adjudications would be consistent with this
important directive.
In addition to its improper reading of Eagle County, the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Oregon incorrectly reasoned that state water law
treats surface and groundwater separately. The court quoted a portion of
Beck’s treatise Waters and Water Rights indicating that states have not
adopted a legal regime for uniform treatment of surface and
groundwater. 220 By relying on this narrow statement, the court failed to
acknowledge states, such as Washington,221 that do recognize the science
of hydrologic continuity and have integrated it into water rights
adjudications. Simply because states have not adopted a uniform system
for managing surface and groundwater together does not mean states
should not adjudicate surface and groundwater together. There are
circumstances in which the two must be considered together, such as
when a state is attempting to quantify tribal water rights.
Furthermore, the United States Solicitor General’s brief in opposition
to the Klamath Tribe’s petition for writ of certiorari supports a finding
that the Ninth Circuit was in error. The Solicitor General explicitly
stated that the Ninth Circuit was wrong in ruling that the McCarran
Amendment does not require the inclusion of hydrologically connected

216. See supra notes 198–210 and accompanying text (discussing the Acquavella litigation).
217. Hubbard v. State, 86 Wash. App. 119, 122, 936 P.2d 27, 28 (1997).
218. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 93, 11 P.3d 726, 741 (2000).
219. Id. at 93, 11 P.3d at 741.
220. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[S]cientists have long delighted
in pointing out to lawyers that all waters are interrelated in one continuous hydrologic cycle. As a
result, it has become fashionable to argue that an effective legal regime should govern all forms and
uses of water in a consistent and uniform manner. The law is otherwise.” (quoting 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, § 6.02) (Robert E. Beck & Amy L. Kelly eds., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender
2009)).
221. See supra Part V.A.
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groundwater.222 The Solicitor General referenced the congressional
intent behind the Amendment of the need to avoid piecemeal litigation
of water rights and emphasized that comprehensiveness should include
hydrologically connected groundwater.223 Although the cert petition was
denied for lack of extensive consideration by other courts, perhaps now,
nearly seventeen years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the time is ripe
to re-address this issue.
In Washington, there is even another reason not to follow the Ninth
Circuit: the importance of water to tribal communities224 and the
hesitancy of tribes to trust state court adjudications of water rights.225
These factors argue in favor of including groundwater in general stream
adjudications. Even though the United States Supreme Court promised
exacting scrutiny should a state court abuse tribal water rights,226
adjudications can “linger indefinitely in the lower courts,” waiting for
the final judgment that is needed for appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court.227 State court adjudications of tribal water rights should therefore
be allowed to proceed only where all the prerequisites for a waiver of
federal sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment are met,
including hydrological comprehensiveness.

222. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 10, Klamath Tribe v. Oregon, 516 U.S. 943
(1995) (No. 95-151), 1995 WL 17047729 (citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Dugan,
Colorado River, and Eagle County to support the argument that comprehensiveness under the
McCarran Amendment would require the inclusion of groundwater in general stream adjudications).
223. Id. at 11 (“The United States and the Tribe will be forced to bring numerous federal or state
court actions to address issues concerning competing claims to the same water, which necessarily
will be left unresolved by Oregon’s incomplete proceeding.”).
224. See Feldman, supra note 19, at 433 (stating “water is the blood of our tribes” (quoting Frank
Tenorio, Epigraph to AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., INDIAN WATER POLICY IN A
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN WATER RIGHTS, at 2 (Patricia Zell ed.,
1982))).
225. Id. at 449 (“Indian water rights—no matter how critical to a tribe’s future, no matter how
well inventoried, no matter how brilliantly defended by Government attorneys, cannot receive full
protection in State court forums.” (quoting Senator Edward Kennedy in Indian Water Rights:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976))).
226. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983).
227. Id.
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Including Groundwater in General Stream Adjudications
Comports with Congressional Intent in Passing the McCarran
Amendment

In passing the McCarran Amendment, Congress sought to prevent
piecemeal litigation of federal reserved water rights.228 Subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court cases have recognized Congress’ intent.229 Requiring that
surface and groundwater be adjudicated together would be consistent
with Congress’ intent to promote holistic, as opposed to piecemeal,
litigation. General stream adjudications including both surface and
groundwater rights will allow the federal government to litigate its water
rights only once for each water source. Conversely, treating surface and
groundwater separately would require the federal government to
participate in multiple legal actions, with the possibility of decades
lapsing between adjudications due to their high cost and extensive
scope.230
In Washington, the Yakima County Superior Court rejected
hydrological comprehensiveness in the Acquavella adjudication based
on the court’s interpretation of the McCarran Amendment.231 This
interpretation, however, ignores Congress’ intent in passing the
McCarran Amendment—to avoid piecemeal adjudications of federal
water rights.232 It is only through comprehensive adjudication of both
surface and groundwater that priorities and quantities of use in a
hydrologically connected water source can be articulated with sufficient

228. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We agree that the McCarran
Amendment was motivated in large part by the recognition of the interconnection of water rights
among claimants to a common water source and the desire to avoid piecemeal adjudication of such
rights.”).
229. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 811–13 (1976); United
States v. Dist. Court in and for the Cnty. of Eagle Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 525 (1971); Dugan v. Rank,
372 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1963).
230. See, e.g., BENNO BONKOWSKI, WATER RES. PROGRAM, STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF
ECOLOGY, PUB. NO. 09-11-017, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
WILL PROTECT WATER RIGHTS IN SPOKANE AREA 1 (June 2009), available at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/0911017.pdf (discussing the large amount of preparatory work that
goes into an adjudication, the “importance and enormity of the task,” the expense of an
adjudication, and the delay in time from the beginning of preparations for an adjudication and the
actual filing of the case in court).
231. Memorandum Opinion re: Motion to Join Parties or Dismiss the United States at 19, Dep’t
of Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1985). This opinion is not
available in most legal databases. It is on file with Washington Law Review.
232. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 819 (“The clear federal policy evinced by [the McCarran
Amendment] is the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system.”).
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legal clarity. This is necessary to enable holders of federal reserved
water rights to enjoin interfering uses.
As the Acquavella adjudication in Washington draws to a close after
more than thirty years, a second adjudication for groundwater rights in
the Yakima River Basin may be necessary.233 This further demonstrates
the inefficiency of not adjudicating groundwater rights during the
surface water adjudication. Before that proceeds, the Department of
Ecology will likely begin an adjudication of the Spokane River area.234
Any future general stream adjudication in Washington that includes
federal reserved water rights should address both surface and
groundwater use. This will guarantee compliance with the McCarran
Amendment’s comprehensiveness requirement and ensure waiver of
federal sovereign immunity for the adjudication.235
CONCLUSION
If a state wishes to adjudicate a federal water right in a general stream
adjudication, then federal sovereign immunity must be waived under the
McCarran Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has
determined that the waiver of sovereign immunity is effective only when
the adjudication is comprehensive, meaning that it covers all of the
rights in the river system being adjudicated. The Court’s
comprehensiveness requirement for the McCarran Amendment comports
with Congress’ intent to avoid piecemeal adjudications of federal water
rights. In addition, the tribal preference for a federal forum in water
rights determinations further stresses the importance of only waiving
sovereign immunity when a state adjudication is truly comprehensive.
Scientists recognize the hydrologic connection between surface and
233. Judge Stauffacher noted that there were at least 19,000 groundwater claimants, a number
which has surely grown since 1985. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5, at 5; Memorandum from the
Water Res. Advisory Comm., Yakima Basin Water Res. Agency, at 2 (July 18, 2007), available at
http://www.yakimacounty.us/ybwra/2007_DIP_Final/Appendices%20A,%20C-J%5CJ%20Inchoate
%20Water%20Rights.doc. (“The Yakima Basin has been in the process of adjudicating surface
water rights for the last thirty years. This has been conducted at great expense to the state and all
parties involved. . . . Some discussion has centered on the need for future groundwater
adjudication.”).
234. BENNO BONKOWSKI, WATER RES. PROGRAM, STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PUB.
NO. 09-11-017, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION WILL PROTECT
WATER RIGHTS IN SPOKANE AREA 1 (June 2009), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/
0911017.pdf
235. Although this Comment focused on the necessity of hydrologic comprehensiveness for a
waiver of federal sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment, the principles of hydrologic
continuity discussed support the inclusion of both surface and groundwater in any general stream
adjudication regardless of whether federal reserved water rights are involved.
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groundwater, and the law has increasingly come to acknowledge this
link. A comprehensive adjudication under the McCarran Amendment
should always include hydrologically connected surface and
groundwaters.
Without
a
requirement
of
hydrological
comprehensiveness, a surface water adjudication would be incomplete.
Numerous groundwater users would be left out of the adjudication and
would not have clearly defined rights in respect to their connected
surface water counterparts. This would result in the federal government,
including tribes, having to litigate for groundwater rights separately.
As Washington State prepares for new adjudications involving federal
and tribal water rights, it is imperative that the adjudications cover both
surface and groundwater in order to fulfill the comprehensiveness
requirement of the McCarran Amendment.

